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misunderstanding and sometimes outright deceit. Therefore,
at the outset, this article will make some seemingly
elementary points concerning the definition of services and
what does and does not fall under “Bolkestein”. It will
subsequently recall the economic urgency of addressing
the internal market of services, followed by some empirical
economic evidence of the impact of the horizontal directive,
with and without the origin principle (its most debated
element). The reader is warned that this empirical work is
highly tentative given the nature of services and the analytical
economic problems involved when asked to come up with
quantifications of impact. Nevertheless, what analysis there
is points to significant gains. The reasons for the often fierce
opposition in 2004 and 2005 are to be found elsewhere,
and these will be dealt with next. Partly, they can be
characterised as fears for losses of (what economists call)
“rents”. Rents benefit the firms which enjoy a non-competitive
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Almost four decades after the end of the transition period
of the EEC treaty, the EU remains confused and bewildered
about one of the basic elements of European economic
integration: its internal market for services. It is not only a
fundamental obligation in the treaty. Realising a well-
functioning internal market for services is also necessary
and desirable from an economic perspective. In the longer
run, Europe’s growth and employment, let alone its
dynamism, cannot possibly come solely from industry and
agriculture. However, the consternation about the horizontal
approach to services, which culminated in the drastic
amendments of the draft directive proposed by former EU
Commissioner Frederik Bolkestein, has shown once again
how socially and politically sensitive this domain is and will
be for a long time to come. But there was and is a lot of
The EU remains confused and bewildered about its fragmented internal market for services after
a hectic political debate of almost three years, culminating in the adoption of directive 2006/
123. This directive, now in force even if the Member States have until December 2009 to
implement it and adapt local laws where required, is quite different from the draft proposed by
the Commission early 2004. The present contribution attempts to provide an analytical
economic approach, first by explaining what services are and what their regulatory logic is under
the internal market regime; second, by making the (strong) economic case for horizontal
liberalisation and in stressing the urgency of it; third, by reporting on a few economic impact
studies of the draft Bolkestein directive, both with and without the origin principle. Overall, the
emerging analytical economic literature supports the move by the Commission and identifies
some of the main sources of economic gains (in particular, the establishment section of the
directive!). Although it is true that some of these arguments have convinced the EU legislature
(Council and European Parliament) that legislative action had to be pushed through in any event,
debates have been dominated (and to a considerable extent, “polluted”) by grossly misleading
political framing, ideological positioning disconnected to the substance of the text and pressures
from a long queue of vested interests. Therefore, an attempt is made, be it very brief, to unravel
the politicisation of the process by distinguishing five sources of discontent or anxieties. Apart
from some misunderstandings where were exploited by opponents, the main explanation of the
political turmoil is likely to have been the broader socio-economic context of Eastern enlargement,
recessionist circumstances, the fears of globalisation and continuous market-oriented reforms
in many Member States. Pragmatic further progress might well be realized due to screening by
the Member States and the 2010 “rendez-vous” clause.E
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environment. They may include higher revenues or only
minimum pressures for economic performance of current
service providers made possible by the lack of competition
or by rules and institutions pre-empting broader choice for
customers or consumers or indeed preventing easy entry
into the market. Those enjoying rents are naturally opposed
to initiatives which threaten to remove them. Partly, however,
the opposition has to be
defined from the overall
socio-economic context –
particularly in Western
Europe and this in the very
year of a major Eastern
enlargement of the Union –
as well as by the multi-level
lobbying strategies of interest
groups and the short-term
political agendas of several
leaders of Member States.
Finally, the nature and very
broad scope of the first
proposal, the widespread
misunderstandings about its legal meaning and the lack of
sufficiently hard economic analysis at the outset all militated
against a smooth and swift passage through the EU
legislative machine.
Respecting the basics: definitions and coverage of Respecting the basics: definitions and coverage of Respecting the basics: definitions and coverage of Respecting the basics: definitions and coverage of Respecting the basics: definitions and coverage of
services services services services services
The reader should attempt to answer the question “What
are services, exactly?” before reading the rest of this article.
Some would say, presumably, that services are all the
economic activities which fall outside the agro and fishing
industries and outside manufacturing and mining. Such a
negative definition suggests that it is a leftover category and
tells us nothing about the common economic characteristics
of these activities. Other readers might recall the famous
definition that services cannot “drop on your feet”. One
might also note that the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (World Trade Organisation) distinguishes four
modes of delivery of services (not very different from the EC
treaty) without, however, defining services themselves. In
economic terms, services are credence or experience goods
which are usually (but not always) for simultaneous
consumption when produced, intangible and unsuitable
for tariff duties, for example, (though not for taxation) and
highly differentiated. In the EC treaty, services can be
temporary (subject to free movement) and permanent
(subject to the right of establishment). The temporary
services can be pure cross-border, or, the consumer crosses
the border to enjoy the service, or, the producer crosses the
intra-EU border(s) to deliver the service. All these elements
cannot be overlooked if one wishes to understand the
internal market for services, but they are anything but
sufficient.
What is required is to apply the internal market
“regulatory” logic to services categories. In order to do this
properly, one has to go through the five consecutive steps
which follow (for elaboration, see Pelkmans, 2006, chapter
7). First, distinguish economic from non-economic (e.g.,
social) services; only economic services fall under the
internal market. Second, distinguish B2B from B2C services,
the reason being that consumer protection can be justified
in the latter case, and, in turn, this might lead to cumbersome
harmonisation issues (which should not apply to B2B!).
Third, distinguish tradeable from non-tradeable services; if
it is non-tradeable, then free movement is irrelevant,
though the right of establishment still applies. Fourth, if
tradeable, are services regulated or non-regulated? Fifth,
if regulated, are services network-based or non-networked,
as this is treated quite differently in the treaty.
The non-tradeable cate-
gory is a complicated, mixed
bag, many services of which
are non-economic (including
most government services,
of course). However, a small
percentage of certain sub-
sectors might not be so
clearly “non-economic”, and
at times also become poten-
tially “tradeable”. This has
led to sensitive problems of
drawing clear demarcations
(be it by the European Court
of Justice or in EC directives
to come) between non-economic and (sufficiently) market-
based activities. Lack of clarity about or resistance against
the discretion of EU bodies to decide such demarcations
has caused turmoil in the European Parliament and the
Council, if not in many Member States, primarily in the
health and education sectors.
Many services are regulated. Network-based services
fall under Article 86, EC and have become subject to
special regimes combining liberalisation, regulation and
competition policy (see Pelkmans, 2001, for a survey of all
seven sectors specified). The confusion caused by the first
Bolkestein draft was that some of these sectors were placed
under a derogation and other ones not, thereby inevitably
prompting the suspicion that the draft proposal amounted
to a further liberalisation through the back door of horizontal
liberalisation rather than sector-specific. The non-networked
sectors are subdivided into real versus financial services, as
well as pure consumer services. The real ones include the
dynamic class of business services, with some subsectors
nevertheless remaining quite resistant to cross-border
competitive exposure (e.g., professional services, with often
anti-competitive self-regulation; also, repair and
maintenance of larger infrastructure and premises, in-
cluding, e.g., railway infrastructure) or subject to sensitive
local rules (e.g., advertising). Cross-border retail and
wholesale belong to the cases where the “economic needs”
test was still required in no less than seven Member States
in 2002 – a major violation of the economic freedoms in the
treaty. Non-networked transport has been liberalised for a
long time and is regulated under a separate chapter in the
treaty and, hence, falls outside horizontal services
liberalisation. The same goes for the three financial sectors
ever since EC-1992 and even more after the successful
Financial Services Action Plan, completed in 2005. This
leaves the pure consumer services, which do fall under the
first Commission proposal, but entail some demarcations
issues.
A simple fact worth reflecting on in the light of the
Bolkestein draft is that the current services trade across
intra-EU borders (remember, a mere 20% of goods trade)
is largely made up of activities from the very sectors not
falling under the Bolkestein draft! One should think of
tourism and some other “non-regulated” services (true,
The EU remains confused
and bewildered about one
of the basic elements of
European economic
integration: its internal
market for services.
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they fall under the draft but as they are non-regulated, the
impact is minimal), the three financial services, the trans-
port sector (with road haulage dominating above all) and
the network sectors. The consternation about the non-
economic (and often local, too) services was about socio-
politically sensitive demarcation and hardly, or not at all,
about the expected economic impacts. Apparently, the
remaining sectors have so far hardly generated cross-
border services trade! And when the Commission at long
last suggested they should be subjected to the internal
market in earnest, the sensitivities came out in the open for
the first time in fifty years.
The present article refrains from a detailed description
of the first draft directive and the one finally adopted (see
Dr Timm Rentrop elsewhere in this issue). Only a few
sketchy points, which follow below, are needed for the
appreciation of a rough economic assessment. The first
draft services framework directive (Bolkestein) consists of
two parts: that on free movement and that about free
establishment. These basic treaty freedoms have been
subject to a litany of ECJ rulings (see European Commission,
2001, and Hatzopoulos &
Do, 2006). The case-driven
liberalisation as well as
derogations implicit in this
case law have been helpful,
but, by their nature, fail to
overcome deep-seated re-
sistance against genuine
competitive exposure of
services, even when com-
bined with appropriate
regulation. To put it simply,
the EU legislator should have
acted much earlier, indeed
decades ago. They did so
only in selected sectors, not
generally. The draft is a
belated attempt to do exactly that. In order to catch up
rapidly, and given the emphasis on growth in the Lisbon
Strategy, the approach in the “free movement” part consisted
of (1) the introduction of the radical “origin principle”, (2)
a list of derogations from the principle, (3) a blacklist of a
number of protectionist or disproportionate practices of
Member States. The origin principle has caused a lot of
misunderstandings and deliberate (mis)framings. Whether
or not the principle is undermining social accomplishments
(e.g., social dumping) hinges on the accompanying
legislation and the justification of domestic regulation
which could serve as a derogation. In fact, a lot of
protectionist rules and practices would automatically become
irrelevant by the principle, because what it says is merely
that home-country rules apply. But this does not mean at all
that, for this reason, it is anti-social or pure deregulation.
Before judging that, one must appreciate first all the
derogations and, second, the other constraining rules
which severely limit the impact of the principle. Thus, the
working of the principle was significantly constrained by the
explicit maintenance of existing EU directives, by far the
most important being the Posted Workers directive. This
directive regulates the conditions for workers posted for a
temporary service in another EU country. The directive is
based on “host-country control” for most of these conditions,
in particular wage and some non-wage costs. In economic
terms, what this means is that wage competition between
workers from different Member States is either directly
outlawed or is outlawed by supplementary legislation in the
host country. The approach in the “free establishment” part
does not hinge on the origin principle, but remains based
(as it always has) on host-country rules. The difference is
that a blacklist of bad practices (such as the “economic
needs” test) now directly forbids them and they must be
removed from domestic legislation. There are also provisions
for a “one-stop desk” in Member States for EU investors in
services and for screening of domestic laws for purposes of
future harmonisation where needed.
The economic case for performing services in Europe The economic case for performing services in Europe The economic case for performing services in Europe The economic case for performing services in Europe The economic case for performing services in Europe
In the EU-27 nearly 70% of GDP is generated by services
activities: almost 72% in the EU-15 and over 60% (and
rising) in the new Member States. Thus, even if EU agriculture
and industry together exhibited steady technical progress
and better management and continually came up with new
products, it would be bound to have only a limited effect on
overall economic growth and employment, merely because
of their small and slowly
decreasing share in overall
activity. Insofar as services
are inputs of the production
and the delivery of such
products – as indeed is
increasingly the case – it will
be essential to the competi-
tiveness of European indus-
try and the agro sector that
such business services are
themselves dynamic and
competitive, stimulated by
an internal market which
facilitates entry, innovation
and variety. Where services
are directly consumed by
individuals or constitute inputs for other services, and these
inputs are not necessarily local, the impetus for greater
dynamism can be strengthened by opening up these
markets to actual or potential cross-border competition
from the entire Union. In the internal market for goods,
these statements have long been accepted as elementary,
and a balanced combination of market forces, economic
freedoms, competition policy and appropriate regulation
ensures its effective functioning. When it comes to
liberalisation of services, and despite a very similar obligation
in the treaty, the convictions are less widespread or even
selectively denied. Policy makers and analysts are expected
to make the case first and, more often than not, have to row
against a tide of anxieties and suspicions.
A few basic facts and results from economic research
underline the urgency of addressing the performance of
services in the EU:
i Annual growth rates of value added (in constant 1995
prices) between 1979 and 2003 (EU-15) amounted to
4.2% for business services, against 2.2% for
manufacturing, 2.3% for distributive trades, 2.4% for
transport and 2.5% for finance (source: Kox & Rubalcaba,
2007). The shining performance is explained by the
close link with the Europeanisation of manufacturing
(services following goods), by the trend – forced by
fiercer competition in the internal goods market – to go
back to “core business” (thereby often divesting internal
The consternation about
the non-economic services
was about socio-politically
sensitive demarcation and
hardly, or not at all, about
the expected economic
impacts.
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services and thus boosting the statistical growth in
business services) and by a relatively high share of
knowledge-intensive services in the category of business
services. Nevertheless, cross-border business services
are often unnecessarily costly due to cumbersome
obligations and entry barriers, greatly discouraging
SMEs to enter cross-border activities, even though these
SMEs are dominating services in their home markets.
B2C services across intra-EU borders are minimal
(apart from tourism) and there is little evidence of
growth except through internet sales.
ii Services in Europe may not be dynamic enough, as is
often held, but they are by no means stagnant. Thus,
when focussing on all new firms in the EU-15 in, for
example, the year 2000, the European Commission
(2003) found that new entrants in services added up to
65% of all new firms. It is also crucial to realise that the
share of SMEs in services is extremely high and far
higher indeed than in manufacturing. This characteristic
makes it all the more important that access to other EU
countries should not be discouraged by extra burdens of
protectionism because such features have a
disproportional negative effect on SMEs.
iii What matters for the internal market are “tradeable
services”, that is, services that can be traded across
intra-EU borders. Taking into account the diversity of the
services sector in the respective Member States, the non-
tradeable sector (e.g., government services, local ones,
be they for profit or non-profit) can range from 20% to
over 30% of GDP. In other words, services potentially
tradeable in the internal market could amount to some
40% or more of GDP, which is much higher than the
actual intra-EU trade in goods (!) today. In sharp
contrast, the actual services trade in the EU hovers
around one-fifth of intra-EU goods trade! Knowing the
many cumbersome restrictions in the internal market for
services (European Commission, 2002), it is hard to
escape the conclusion that EU countries could greatly
boost intra-EU services trade by opening up radically to
each other. How far one could expect this boost to go is
difficult to know because goods and services are not
fully comparable. Services are based on trust and well-
established relationships because they are so-called
“credence” or “experience” goods, unlike most tangible
goods which can be characterised as “search” goods
and, hence, easier to verify. Therefore, proximity to
customers is crucial for most services, hence, local
establishment, rather than distant trade, is the preferred
mode of delivery or market access. New technologies
have changed that somewhat, but there is no doubt that
the potential share of services trade cannot be
mechanically derived by a comparison with goods.
Indeed, a serious study of the internal market for
services must provide reliable data on local production
of services by establishments from other EU countries,
besides intra-EU trade. One problem here is that many
such establishments are small and not easily traced
from statistics.
iv There are other indicators pointing to a serious under-
exploitation of the internal market for services. Two
examples follow. Kox, Lejour & Montizaan, 2005,
constructed a trade-openness index for EU countries
and found services trade-openness to be low, with very
low indices for relatively big countries such as France,
Germany and Spain. Turning to establishment, data on
services generated by foreign establishments are scarce;
what data there is (based on OECD FATS data) shows,
for example, that in 2002 the share of employment in
overall services employment in the relevant country
never exceeded 20% and was as low as 5.6% in France,
2.9% in Germany and 5.1% in Italy. Compared to
employment in foreign establishments in manufacturing,
their shares were higher than shares for services in every
EU country and the gap was never smaller than one-
third, and often more than half. When observing these
discrepancies, one should not forget that precisely in
services, the mode of establishment is far more attractive,
if not imperative, for a durable presence in the market
than it is for goods.
v In the last few years, analysts have drawn attention to
high growth rates of selected services in the United
States, compared to the EU, as the main explanation of
the transatlantic growth gap between the mid-nineties
and (say) 2005. For example, in Van Ark (2004),
aggregate labour productivity growth of the US and the
EU-15 are decomposed by sectors for the period between
1995 and 2002. He found that four of the five sectors
with the highest labour productivity growth were services:
retail (except that of motor vehicles), wholesale trade,
financial intermediation and activities auxiliary to
financial intermediation. Of the eight-year average of
2.46%, these four services sectors account for 1.16%. In
the EU, by contrast, the four sectors make up a mere
0.16% of the eight-year EU-15 average of 1.64%. These
findings would seem to suggest that the regulatory
environment for services and/or restrictions to exploit
the internal services market seem to hinder a more or
less similar development of such sectors in the Union.
This would seem to be consistent with the results of the
wide-ranging OECD work on the impact of restrictive
regulations (including market entry and cross-border
access) for the period up to and including 2003 (Conway,
Janod & Nicoletti, 2005). Restrictions and lack of
competition might also be a major reason why ICT-
usage in European services is falling ever more behind
that in the US (see, e.g., Denis, McMorrow, Roeger &
Veugelers, 2005).
Economic impact studies about the internal market for Economic impact studies about the internal market for Economic impact studies about the internal market for Economic impact studies about the internal market for Economic impact studies about the internal market for
services services services services services
Since 2003 new EU proposals for legislation have to be
subject to Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). One would
expect the RIA1 of the Bolkestein draft to comprise a survey
of the relevant economic impact studies available and/or
the results of a targeted impact study commissioned for RIA
purposes. Even though the RIA of “Bolkestein” serves the
purpose of analytical clarification and also helps the reader
to appreciate the choice between several options for the EU
services market, it fails to provide a survey of genuine
impact studies and does not provide even proxy
quantifications of the economic impact. It is of critical
importance to understand why. By the end of 2003 (when
the RIA was concluded), quantitative studies were simply
not available. In analytical economics, services had long
been “stepmotherly” treated and in international economics
the absence of modelling work was conspicuous. One
amongst several reasons consisted in the tremendous
complexity of barriers to entry and to market access; a
related reason was that regulatory barriers (not tariffs) had
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to be assessed as to their price and non-price effects, which
is extremely difficult; yet another reason consisted in the
lack of reliable data for all the barriers to services trade and
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for all the Member States,
the result of decades of neglect by the EU of the internal
market of services! Given all those reasons, the Commission
was simply not in the position to “guesstimate” the economic
impact. The lack of quantified “guesstimates” in the RIA did
not help, of course, to facilitate a smooth passage of the
draft through the EU legislator, that is, the EP and the
Council.
During the policy debate in the EU legislator, two studies
became available which, in different methodological ways,
produced some rough estimates. Kox, Lejour & Montizaan
(2004) found an ingenious method to arrive at rough
(minimum) estimates by utilising the extremely detailed
OECD database of regulation and studying the differences
in legislation in every bilateral relation between two EU
countries as cost-increasing barriers to cross-border service
providers. The underlying idea was that heterogeneity in
such bilateral relations is costly in and by itself, but these
costs quickly multiply once more bilateral relations are
exploited by service providers interested in trade in the
internal market. The authors used a gravity model to show
the empirical effects of heterogeneity in services rules in the
internal market and subsequently attempted to assess the
economic impact of lowering that heterogeneity because of
the Bolkestein draft. They estimated an increase of intra-EU
services trade of 15-30%, but in a later refinement a range
up to 60%. In a slightly different fashion, they also estimated
the impact of freer establishment due to the draft proposal,
expecting an increase of 20-35%. Also, the EU GDP would
increase between 0.3% and 0.6%, assuming a faithful
implementation.
The other team studying the economic impact was
Copenhagen Economics (2005), on request of the Com-
mission. Their approach was closer to what conventional
economics would suggest: an attempt to identify the barriers
which distort or prevent services trade in the internal
market, convert them into so-called “tariff-equivalents”,
amalgamate them in a barrier index and see how the index
would change with the Bolkestein draft. The index change
is related to efficiency improvements and cost reductions of
services companies. The empirical effects are then found by
applying this to a database of 275,000 firms of all possible
services sectors. The macro-economic impact is derived
from the Copenhagen model for trade and investment. The
overall effect on economic welfare in the EU amounts to
€37 billion, besides a growth in jobs of 600,000.
This short contribution is not the place to discuss the
merits and technicalities of the two studies. For such a
sweeping horizontal directive, all one can say is that the two
estimates are not that far apart and distinctly positive. It is
interesting to note that most of the gains result from the
“free establishment” part of the directive, which is consistent
with the general notion that services delivery is more
naturally conducted via direct presence in the local market.
One should not forget, when reading these estimates, that
a number of leading services sectors do not fall under
horizontal liberalisation and hence are not part of these
numbers. In follow-up studies, both centres have attempted
to isolate the effect of the origin principle (i.e., trade alone)
because it was so controversial in the debate. In de Bruijn,
Kox & Lejour, 2006, the origin principle was found to
generate one-third of the welfare gains – the overall results
with and without the origin principle are depicted in Figure
1. Copenhagen Economics come to a mere 10%. These
findings confirm that much of the political heat on the origin
principle completely disregarded that the establishment
part of the directive (which has largely survived the radical
amendments in the EP) is the true source of benefits. The
removal of the origin principle in the adopted services
directive 2006/123/EC2 is almost certainly detrimental to
the erstwhile expected impact on intra-EU trade, but this
does not mean that the adopted directive would not signify
progress in economic terms.
Figure 1 : Macroeconomic Effects of Services Directive with and without the Country of Origin Principle Figure 1 : Macroeconomic Effects of Services Directive with and without the Country of Origin Principle Figure 1 : Macroeconomic Effects of Services Directive with and without the Country of Origin Principle Figure 1 : Macroeconomic Effects of Services Directive with and without the Country of Origin Principle Figure 1 : Macroeconomic Effects of Services Directive with and without the Country of Origin Principle
Source: R. de Bruyn, H. Kox & A. Lejour, CPB Document 108, February 2006; The trade-induced effects of the services
directive and the country-of-origin principle.
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Few other impact studies appear to have been made.
But perhaps it is interesting to mention the Price-
WaterhouseCoopers (2005) collection of thirty-eight
business case studies of companies anticipating the services
directive because its approach is so different from that of
economic modelling. The larger services companies typically
regard all Member States as separate markets for many
reasons, only some of which
result from policies or laws
affected by the Bolkestein
draft. When seeking estab-
lishment, companies know
beforehand that this is an
expensive route, and policy-
related barrier removal (as
in the services directive) would
not so easily affect, in a
decisive way, the economics
of establishing an office or
new subsidiary. The study
suggests that up to 40% of
the barriers to establishment
would be addressed by the
directive. As to services trade,
the low costs of this mode of
delivery – and the absence of
almost any fixed or sunk costs
– make it ideal for SMEs. Again, there is not so much
support in the cases that the directive (then still the draft with
the origin principle) would make a major difference as
many other barriers, including culture, language, etc.,
would be more important in the final analysis. Although the
number of sectors was limited, the diversity was nevertheless
considerable.3
A concluding note on political economy A concluding note on political economy A concluding note on political economy A concluding note on political economy A concluding note on political economy
The political economy of the process of amending and
adopting the services directive 2006/123 is as fascinating
as it is complex. Politicisation was more widespread and
intense than in the case of almost any directive ever before.
But that had not been foreseen by most political actors. In
2000 a strategy for a deeper and wider internal market for
services was unanimously accepted by all Member States
as a crucial element of the Lisbon Strategy. In 2002 the
Commission showed in great detail how numerous, costly
and, at times, prohibitive, the barriers and red tape were
and how they had prevailed in the badly functioning
internal market for services. As a result, the Council urged
the Commission to come up with a horizontal proposal to
tackle them. It was only in the course of 2004 and more
vigorously during 2005 that an unusually hectic process of
politicisation unfolded.
There are many ways in which one can explain the
politicisation – all partial, and presumably ignoring the
interaction between several political economy processes.
The intensity was unusual, surely, but so was the degree of
political framing (an academically neutral term for what in
this case amounted to often misleading and indeed plainly
wrong presentations of the substance of the directive).
Among the more important ways to explain politicisation,
one may include (1) the complexity of the directive (a
horizontal directive over many incredibly diverse services
and based on sophisticated ECJ case law), (2) the discourse
around the origin principle which led to two very different
strategies of politicisation (that is, to political, if not
ideological, debate over the principle itself and to a long
queue of lobbies seeking a derogation from the principle),
(3) the diversity in the way services and related labour
questions were dealt with in the various Member States and
– as a result – the strong incentives for lobbies to engage
in multi-level lobbying (i.e., at domestic and EU levels, via
the government and/or
parliament to the Council,
and directly via European
umbrella organisations
lobbying mostly the EP), (4)
the decisive role of the EP,
due in part to the paralysis
in the Council, a role which
significantly intensified
politicisation (indeed, so
much so that it might be
better to speak of polari-
sation) and, last but not
least, (5) the unfortunate
timing of the proposal in the
very year that combined a
low tide in economic growth
of the Union, a semi-
permanent emphasis on
further reforms under the
flag of Lisbon much resisted precisely in Member States with
considerable unemployment, the entry of ten new Member
States which already caused anxiety due to the huge wage
gap with the EU-15 and the upcoming decision about a
new constitutional treaty.
Thus, to say that rent seekers were the main reason for
opposition is too simple, even if there is clear evidence that
rent seeking manifested itself in the many requests for
derogations (from the liberal professions to taxies!) and,
possibly, in the fierce resistance against the combination of
the draft services directive and the Posted Workers directive
in the countries not having general minimum wage
legislation (first of all, Sweden and Denmark, and in a less
general way, Germany). The latter issue turns around the
practical impact of service providers from (say) new Member
States, which could be subsidiaries of German or Swedish
companies, offering temporary services at wages far below
the collective agreements in these three countries and not
hindered by wage floors in the law. The obvious remedy –
to enact a minimum wage legislation – is fiercely resisted in
these countries for reasons that look like a combination of
local ideology (“the government or politics should stay out
of industrial relations”) and all-too-cosy closed-shop
practices. Respecting diversity among Member States would
imply here that the internal market for (temporary) services
would not be under the conditional and moderate host-
country control of the Posted Workers directive 96/71 but
under absolute host-country control entirely dictated by the
social partners in such countries. Such an extreme view
would be defended as a “right of social partners to make
collective agreements”, but would fragment the internal
market for temporary services as the advantages of workers
from the new Member States are totally removed.
Incidentally, it would also apply to the “free” movement of
workers: the “free” movement would be throttled as host-
country control reduces the demand for workers from the
new Member States to a trickle (see Pelkmans, 2006, p. 198
for a formal analysis).
The political economy of
the process of amending
and adopting the services
directive 2006/123 is as
fascinating as it is complex.
Politicisation was more
widespread and intense
than in the case of almost
any directive ever before.
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However, the fascinating effect of the fierce lobbying by
the Swedish and Danish labour unions was that they ended
up in the same camp as the ideological campaign of (very)
leftish labour unions and some politicians in, for example,
France and Belgium, holding
that the services directive
epitomised the “neo-liberal
agenda” of Europe, a view
which was hardly echoed in
Scandinavia or Germany.
Somewhere in early 2004,
several hardliners in some
labour unions decided that
only a “nuclear strategy”
against the draft directive
would have a chance of
blocking the tidal wave of
“liberal” reforms in the Union.
Thus, the socio-economic context in which the draft directive
landed began to substitute the actual substance of the text
of the directive. The debate in some countries and, to a
degree in the EP and the media, became dominated by the
completely misconstrued “plompier polonais”. In sharp
contrast to the framing in politics, this Polish plumber (if
working as an employee in temporary services under the
draft text) would have been obliged to be paid the French
minimum wage plus adherence to several other non-wage
conditions like health and safety and vacation days, for
example (this follows from the Posted Workers directive). If
the Polish plumber provided temporary services as an
independent, he would not need the draft directive because
there is no change from a long tradition of concluding a
service contract, the implicit hourly wage of which is “free”.
If the Polish plumber comes to France or any Member State
(other than the three mentioned above) as a worker
contracted by a French building firm, again host-country
control applies. If he comes illegally, again, the directive is
of no use – it is up to the national authorities to enforce the
law. Linking the draft directive to a “neo-liberal agenda” of
liberalising public utilities, the reforms under Lisbon, a lack
of “Social Europe” or the too tough Stability and Growth
Pact in the eurozone, can all be dismissed analytically as
incorrect, but as a “nuclear
strategy”, it appealed to
those labour unions and
political parties with many
members (often less skilled)
who were convinced that
they were consistently on
the losing side of market-
driven reforms. This tended
to be exacerbated by the
sensitivity of very open
markets to the world econo-
my and the sentiment that
the EU had become “an
agent of globalisation”, by offering an open turnpike for
Chinese imports or due to the “relocalisation of European
business” to the European East or the Far East. A detached
analytical approach of the draft directive is of little use if
politicisation takes such ominous forms. In this climate of
assertions and political framing – often totally disconnected
with the legal and economic substance of the draft – it is
amazing that the EP finally did accomplish a compromise
which at least kept alive the establishment side of the text.
One may also study the positioning of individual
countries. Nearly a dozen governments, sometimes the
Prime Ministers personally, shifted from a generally
favourable view to staunch opposition or Bolkestein bashing
without specifying details. This was prompted by complex
and varying drifts in domestic politics. However, in Western
Europe it is too easily forgotten that the new Member States,
as well as countries such as the UK, the Netherlands and
Spain, remained in favour of an only marginally amended
version of the directive until the French/German/British
compromise was hammered out in May 2006. It should be
The socio-economic context
in which the draft directive
landed began to substitute
the actual substance of the
text of the directive.
© European Community, 2007
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telling to many readers that in the Netherlands, the social
partners in the Socio-Economic Council (SER, 2005; see
also Pelkmans & van Kessel, 2007) unanimously agreed to
an amended version of the directive (with a report going
into almost every conceivable detail and dismissing a lot of
the framing) with the origin principle being upheld! Had the
EP adopted this version, all the serious objections would
have been dealt with appropriately and the internal market
for services would nevertheless have been pushed forward
much more than they have been. In several countries the
services directive became mixed up with the campaigns
about the constitutional treaty. In France, this went so far
that numerous French voters came to believe that the
constitutional treaty was another example of being too
liberal (whereas, in fact, the status quo was purposely kept
in socio-economic affairs, already in the Convention, and
a few marginal amendments are best regarded as going
the other way, e.g., Article III-122).
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
Services liberalisation in the EU is not going to be realised
merely or even primarily on functional grounds. Perceptions
of possible redistributive effects and widespread
misunderstandings still linger today. The services directive
has shown once again how politically sensitive principles
like mutual recognition and the origin principle are, once
they are applied in earnest (see, e.g., Nicolaidis & Schmidt,
2007). The prudent and usually very carefully drafted
considerations in ECJ rulings on such matters – which often
help the internal market to be better enforced, yet are
balanced by public interest arguments – tend to get
completely lost in the hands of the EU politicians and
lobbies. The liberalisation of the internal services market
should be expected to take another decade or more for this
reason alone. The upheaval over the Bolkestein draft surely
had the virtue that, though much too late, all political and
social actors had to reflect on the notions of mutual
recognition and the origin principle and position themselves
publicly. Also, the much hailed but never clearly articulated
“diversity” amongst the Member States’ services regimes
and their underlying labour conditions has emerged from
the haze around it and, in the future, this is bound to form
a better foundation for applying a well-considered
governance of the origin principle or an effective variant of
mutual recognition.
Cautious optimism about progress in the medium-run
can be derived from the current screening process between
the Member States and the Commission as well as the so-
called rendez-vous clause calling for a review paper by the
Commission in 2010. An economic reason for a more
optimistic view over the medium-run is the rapid economic
convergence between the new Member States and the EU-
15, reducing the fear of wage competition. Finally, a few
sensitive dossiers (like health services) have now become
sectoral ones and should no longer derail the horizontal
process.
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